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I. Background to the Seventies:
In the period up to 1960, African political organization in South 
Africa had been dominated by the African National Congress (ANC), formed in 
1912, which stood alone as the voice of politically active Africans until 
1959, when an ANC Youth League breakaway led to the formation of the Pan 
African Congress (PAC). At the peak of its popular mobilization, the ANC 
claimed a membership of up to 100,000, and the PAC claimed up to 30,000, 
mainly drawn away from the ANC. These membership figures are often doubted 
as reflections of formal, paid up enrolment, but they may indicate the 
extent of committed, involved public interest. In the ANC "Defiance Campaign* 
nearly 8,600 *pass-law’ resisters were arrested at one time, there were 
fairly successful boycott campaigns of selected businesses in the Transvaal, 
and certain black residential areas staged well-supported 'stay-at-home* 
strikes among workers. The Pan African Congress also demonstrated a 
capacity to mobilize when shortly after its formation there was a march by 
some 30,000 Africans in Cape Town and numerous other collective acts of 
political protest. After the Sharpeville disaster, when 69 Africans were 
fatally shot after a crowd of up to 30,000 had marched up to a police station 
in protest against pass laws, over 18,000 arrests were made in raids all 
over the country. These estimates clearly show that political activism 
was not limited to cliques and factions in the community.
On the 8th of April, 1960, both the ANC and the PAC were declared 
unlawful organizations in terms of the 'Suppression of Communism Act*. Both 
organizations went underground; the PAC in the form of the secret organiza­
tion 'Poqo' (meaning pure) and the ANC under the name 'Umkonto we Sizwe* 
(Spear of the Nation). While there were fairly extensive Poqo riots in the 
Cape, leading to some 3,000 arrests; an ANC organized strike in the 
Transvaal was largely unsuccessful. For some 3 years Umkonto we Sizwe 
engaged in limited and sporadic acts of sabotage, but clearly, political 
resistance was on the wane.1^
In the period from 1963 to 1968, on the surface at least, there was
1. The preceding brief account is drawn mainly from Peter Walshe, The Rise 
of African Rationalism in South Africa, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1971; Mary Benson, South Africa3 The Struggle for a Birthright} 
Penguin Books, 1966; Gwendolen M. Carter, "African Concepts of 
Nationalism in South Africa" in Heribert Adam (Ed) South Africa, Socio­
logical Perspectives, London, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp.103-120; 
Fatima Meer, "African Nationalism: Some Inhibiting Factors" in Adam,
op. cit., pp. 121-157; Edward Feit, African Opposition in South Africa: 
The Failure of Passive Resistance, Stanford, the Hoover Institution,1967.
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a lull, if not stagnation in African political organization inside South 
Africa. Clearly the collapse of organization was in large measure a 
reflection of the removal by arrest, conviction and tannings of activist 
African leadership and other measures in terms of security laws directed 
against the more activist rank and file followers. Nevertheless, the 
destruction of these organizations as visible movements was accomplished 
remarkably rapidly with little popular rank and file reaction. As said before, 
the organizations enjoyed considerable allegiance, but widespread though this 
support was, the organizations had failed to gain the 'protection’ which would 
have been offered had they been truly mass organizations with the committed 
following of large proportions of the African communities.
From the fifties onwards, when mass membership was actively sought,
2 )the problem of attracting sufficient rank and file support was endemic.
Perhaps the goals, almost always stated in political terms, were too remote 
for grass-roots sentiments based on the day-to-day realities of 
life. Albert Luthuli, a one-time President of the ANC, alludes to this in 
his biography when he cautions activists to consider the implications of the 
everyday consciousness of ordinary Africans. There was perhaps too much hope 
that campaigns would gather momentum of their own accord. Economic and 
security interests of ordinary people were over-shadowed by the perception 
that self-sacrifice was both necessary and possible in the pursuit of the 
longer-range objectives. Self-sacrifice requires ideologies of commitment; 
ideologies found universally more among the young and the well-educated than 
among the rank and file. There was perhaps not sufficient detailed concern 
with what was most pressing and immediate in the consciousness of the man and 
woman in the street. Were the pass laws, for example, of key priority in the 
consciousness of factory workers who had the right to work in town? Then, for 
the ordinary member or would-be supporter, virtually throughout the history 
of the African National Congress, there were demoralising cross-currents of 
opinion about the desirability of collaborating with white liberals, with 
white Marxists, with Indians and Coloureds. Should a clearer "African-South 
African" image of leadership not have been maintained? Finally, perhaps, 
there was the great weakness of so many opposition movements in South Africa, 
this being the under-estimation of the strength and strategy of the white 
Nationalist Government and its control systems. On numerous occasions, a 2
2) See Edward Feit, op. oit., Chapter 3.
massive turn-out of police was interpreted as panic on the part of the
authorities; or as an essential "moral victory" for the movement, when in
3 )fact the coercive apparatus of the state was not even remotely strained.
These questions should not detract, however, from the fact that the 
history of the African National Congress and of related movements is a history 
of great courage, commitment and endurance in the face of well-nigh over­
whelming odds. Anywhere else in Africa, outside of white-ruled Southern Africa 
the movements might have succeeded handsomely. Furthermore, for all their 
strategic setbacks, the African National Congress and Pan African Congress have 
for many Africans, left a legacy of pride and an example of leadership which 
lives on today.
II. The Black Consciousness Movement:
The years of quiescence from 1963 to 1968 were for groups of black 
students a period of interesting ferment. African students sympathetic to the 
ANC had formed the African Students’ Association, those sympathetic to the 
Pan African Congress formed the African Students’ Union of South Africa, and 
there also existed a third grouping - the Progressive National Students’ 
Organization. The latter two organizations opposed all co-operation with the 
multi-racial National Union of South African Students, which was seen to be 
dominated by white liberals. There was severe conflict and rivalry between 
these groupings and their strength, which was never large, steadily declined.
In 1968, black students who had become disillusioned with the 
National Union of South African Students (N.U.S.A.S.), including some who had 
been influenced by American black theology introduced locally by the non-racial 
University Christian Movement, formed the South African Students’ Organization 
(S.A.S.O.). The most prominent person involved - in a Sense the founder of the 
movement - was a medical student of the University of Natal, the now famous 
Steve Biko who died in police detention in 1977. This organization excluded 
whites, and as such, enjoyed a very brief period of acceptance by the 
segregation-minded South African Government authorities. 3
3) Many of the points made above are also made by Feit, op. cit. , and 
Leo Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie: Bace3 Class and Politics in South
Africa, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965.
The South African Students* Organization soon established a strong following 
on the segregated black university campuses. It was to become one of the most 
influential contemporary developments on the South African black political 
scene and constituted, with currents of black theology in the churches, the 
genesis of the modern "Black Consciousness" movement. In 1971, the South 
African Students* Organization convened a national conference, involving a 
wide range of black organizations, aimed at discussing unity and common 
strategy. -Out of this conference, the Black People's Convention (B.P.C.) was 
b o m  in 1972. Also established in 1972, under the umbrella of the Black 
Consciousness movement, was a labour organization, the Black and Allied Workers' 
Union (B.A.W.U.).
The South African Students' Organization and the Black Consciousness 
movement were founded on the central principles of black solidarity, pride, 
self-confidence, self-help and on the need for psychological emancipation from 
the sense of inferiority which centuries of white domination and white 
paternalism have inculcated in blacks. One important aim was to discover 
sources of black identity in the indigenous cultures of South Africa's black 
people; a complex issue, perhaps, since some black people in South Africa have 
cultures of origin other than that of the Southern African Bantu linguistic 
group. There was also a firm rejection of close co-operation with liberal 
or even radical whites; the former in particular were seen as an influence 
which had traditionally weakened the revolutionary zeal of black movements. 
Co-operation with white radicals was avoided, presumably because of the desire 
not to become involved in the dissemination of unmodified foreign Marxist 
ideologies, in a context where they were seen as being not entirely appro­
priate. The mode of operation of the movement involved broad consciencisation 
and community self-help projects, which would instil a sense of self-reliance 
and community solidarity. The movement embraced not only university students, 
but secondary-school students and black adults. The adults involved were 
mainly the "intelligentsia" in the black communities - ministers of religion, 
teachers, professionals and some black businessmen and academics.
Apart from the principles of black unity, solidarity and self-help, 
the movement was dedicated to the liberation of South African blacks, and, as 
such, to black majority rule. In its search for a policy for the future, it 
adopted a range of economic principles broadly typical of African Socialism.
As Hanf and Vierdag put it, if one takes both political and economic ideology 
into account, the Black Consciousness movement seems to stand midway between
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the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress positions of the
4 )late '50's. The stance of the South African Students’ Organization as
regards the African National Congress-Pan African Congress rivalry was indeed
5)one of "positive neutrality".
The major impact has been at the level of "consciousness" and the
conscientising of the black people of South Africa. In this, it achieved
remarkable success among the youth and among the urban intelligentsia.
Fundamental to the type of consciousness which the movement espoused, is the
definition of "Black". Black people were defined as "those who are by law or
tradition, politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a
group in South African society, identifying themselves as a unit in the
6 )struggle roward the realisation of their aspirations". The older inclusive 
term for Africans, Indians and Coloureds - "non-white", was vehemently 
rejected because it was seen to imply a negation of identity and dignity - 
a "non-being" status or a residual status. (It is often used now as a 
derogatory label to describe blacks who still aspire to being like whites .)
An obvious question that arises, is whether or not the Black Consciousness 
ideology is racist or not. Khoapa, however, has drawn a distinction: "going to 
the very gate of racism in order to destroy racism". The views on white 
identity, as reported by Ross , suggest that in a new South Africa, whites 
would be encouraged to remain, but there will be no consideration of minority 
rights for whites - the ideal is a non-racial society, but one created by 
blacks. Whites would not be allowed any group exclusivity. No doubt a great 
measure of anti-white hostility characterised the movement, but that hostility, 
as Biko had so often said, was a response to white racism. In a society where 
racial status has been completely re-ordered, blacks would not necessarily 
display the deep-seated negative stereotyping of people of different colour 
that has been so typical of white behaviour.
In the space of less than ten years, the organizations making up the 
Black Consciousness movement had become very influential among well-educated 
urban blacks, when in October 1977, they were all simultaneously banned by the 4567
4) Theodor Hanf and Gerda Vierdag, People's College, 'The World's' Educational 
Supplement, Deutsches Institut flir International PUdegogesche Forschung, 
Frankfurt, 1977, Section 3-1-1.
5) Thomas Ross, "Erst mussen wir wie Lɓwen werden", Bilder and Zeiturg, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16-4-1977.
6) Bennie Khoapa (Ed.) Black Review 1972, Durban, 1973, pp. 41-42.
7) Ross, op. cit.
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South African Government. No specific reasons for the banning were given, 
but it can be assumed that the government, inter alia, was attempting to 
break the widespread and ongoing resistance to "Bantu education" among African 
youth. This will be discussed in more detail presently. Black Consciousness 
as an idea, and as a guiding ideology, has undoubtedly survived the bannings, 
however, and no African political organization can ignore the guiding 
principles which have emerged.
Black Consciousness is an eloquent assertion of self-worth, dignity,
pride and humanness in the face of dehumanising racism. A measure of its
success is that young Coloured people, members of a group which traditionally
has displayed colour-consciousness and a pro-white bias within its own com- 
8)munities , have moved dramatically closer to African youth and their aspira­
tions (see later). Yet, for all its eloquence and the sophistication of its 
thinking, Black Consciousness remains an ideology of reaction; a reaction 
against white racism.
As we have already indicated, blacks in South Africa are drawn from 
a wide diversity of ethnic backgrounds; among others, Nguni and Sotho- 
speaking African backgrounds, Hindu and Muslim Indian backgrounds, Malay 
Muslim and Christian Coloured backgrounds, etc. The last group, the Christian 
Coloureds, are simply dark-skinned Afrikaners to any outside observer. To 
create a sense of intimate unity which lies deeper than that born of reaction 
to white racism or than pragmatic strategy, is highly problematic. Mayer in 
1972, and Schlemmer in the same year, found little evidence of the inclusive 
"Black" consciousness among non-intellectual, non-student African populations. 
A detailed political survey among urban Africans in the Transvaal and Natal 
has shown recently that no more than roughly 6 percent of a cross-section of 
African adults of all ages could be regarded as clearly defined supporters of 
the Black Consciousness m o v e m e n t .Y e t , th e  political significance of Black 
Consciousness is rather greater than these estimates suggest, however, per­
haps primarily because it has taken root among an educational elite; a group 8910
8) Hendrik van der Merwe, "Social Stratification in a Cape Coloured 
Community", Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 46, 1962, pp. 302-311.
9) Philip Mayer, Urban Africans and the Bantustans, South African Institute 
of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1972, pp. 7-8. Lawrence Schlemmer,
Black Attitudes: Reaction and Adaptation, Centre for Applied Social
Sciences, University of Natal, Durban, 1975.
10) Theodor Hanf et. al., Sudafrika: Friedlicher Wandel?, Munich/Mainz, 
Kaiser/Grunwald, 1978, p.371.
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from which leadership is typically drawn. One signal illustration of this 
importance has been seen in the phenomenon of the township youth unrest in 
1976.
III. Youth Rebellion in the Townships;
For many months prior to June 16th, 1976, African School Boards, 
parents’ associations, school principals and other bodies like the South 
African Institute of Race Relations, had warned the Bantu Educational 
authorities that attempts in the Transvaal to enforce Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction on a 50% basis with English^1 ,^ was unacceptable to African pupils. 
The latter had demonstrated their opposition by sustaining effective boycotts 
in a few schools in Soweto. Yet the authorities resisted all pleas and 
enforced the policy. Afrikaans was unacceptable to African pupils, partly 
because it symbolised the system of Nationalist rule and Separate Development, 
and partly because their teachers and they were not proficient in Afrikaans 
and it would constitute yet another handicap to scholars already subject to 
great disadvantages.
On June the 16th, a crowd of over 1000 school children between the 
ages of roughly seven and over twenty, gathered and formed a procession of 
protest. Their placards read: "Down with Afrikaans", "To hell with
Afrikaans", "Afrikaans stinks", "Afrikaans is a tribal language", etc. A 
foolish display in a country with strong language loyalties, perhaps, but 
certainly not a revolutionary uprising. Their mood was jovial and noisy - 
they were enjoying their defiance of the system. As cars passed, they 
shouted, "Power", and raised fists; not so much a demonstration of violent 
intent as much as an expression of solidarity and determination. These were 
children imbued with the spirit of Black Consciousness, however indirect 
their contact with the movement might have been.
The procession continued with no harm to property or passers-by until 1
11) It has been official policy since 1955 that both English and Afrikaans 
are used on a 50/50 basis in African secondary schools. The policy 
had not been enforced. From the beginning of 1976, however, Bantu 
Education Department officials in some areas of the Transvaal began to 
enforce the formal regulation.
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stopped by the police, fully armed and uncertain, perhaps, about the intentions
of the demonstrators. The police ordered the scholars to disperse. They did
not. The police fired into the air. The demonstrators, infuriated and
frightened, retaliated with stones injuring two policemen. The police fired
into the crowd, killing up to four scholars, one as young as thirteen years
old. The crowd fled, but violence erupted throughout the township and two
white officials were killed. Initially, only government buildings or other
symbols of white authority were affected. Then beerhalls and bottle stores
were destroyed; many of the rioters shouting slogans like, "Less beer, more
12)education", and, "More schools, not bottle stores".
The demonstrations became increasingly focused on political issues 
as time progressed. Apart from the systematic destruction of government and 
white-owned property, the burning of liquor outlets, etc.- the demonstrators 
stoned vehicles on roads outside the township. They began calling upon adults 
to join their campaign. There was one attempted march towards Johannesburg, 
and one demonstration in the streets of central Johannesburg, which was 
quickly stifled. There were calls for general strikes by all black workers.
The calls for strikes were accompanied by pickets to discourage workers from 
catching trains, and workers returning from work were subject to harassment. 
Workers were told that their houses would be burnt if they went to work, and, 
indeed, some workers' homes were attacked. The first one-day strike was 
probably about 75% successful; the second somewhat less successful and the 
third, in November, completely unsuccessful, partly because the police were 
better prepared to protect transportation. Some degree of willing co-operation 
with the youth must have been forthcoming from the workers, however.
By now, the demonstrations had spread to other parts of the country - 
Pretoria, other areas on the Witwatersrand, the Northern Transvaal, the Eastern 
Cape, and, significantly even to Coloured youth in the Western Cape, who 
staged massive demonstrations in the centre of Cape Town, despite formidable 
police retaliation and many deaths.
As the demonstrations progressed, there were also signs of effective 12
12) Since a large proportion of the revenue for administering townships like 
Soweto is derived from the sale of liquor to Africans, these townships 
have been remarkably well serviced with liquor outlets. The demonstra­
tors were fully aware of the connection.
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ad hoc underground organization. Police, naturally, were detaining leaders 
all the time, yet new figures emerged to lead the students, the body mainly 
responsible for the co-ordination being the Soweto Students' Representative 
Council.
Throughout the country, hundreds of lives were being lost. The 
police could quite easily prevent any destruction of property outside the 
townships, but in the townships, the unrest continued for some months, with 
intermittent lulls. The death-toll approached the 500 mark, with over 1000 
injured, and many hundreds arrested. Yet the demonstrators appeared to have 
lost their fear of bullets. They seemed almost inspired by a sense of 
mission, with wave after wave of new vanguards emerging to lead the action.
13)Group interviews with Soweto students, planned by the author 
during October and November 1976, were- • testimony to the almost superhuman 
dedication of the young people. In their responses, there were phrases like, 
"We have no future apart from the struggle", "I no longer fear the gun; when 
there is some shooting I shout, 'Happy' because it has become the order
of the day .... these police have made Soweto sound like a Christmas place ...
their guns sound like crickets on Christmas-time", "We are telling the whites 
that the days of obedient Bantus are over", "People who have been suffering 
a long time have now decided to fight and die if need be", "We will get 
freedom - we shall go on with the struggle until we all get finished", and, 
"They are not going to let go of us until miraculously we explode inside 
their hands."
The notion of struggle acquired a near-mystical quality - the flavour 
of a transcendent mission. "We will achieve freedom. If we are killed, 
stronger ones will come who will continue with this thing until we achieve 
freedom." "There is not a future for us (as individuals)." "The struggle is 
a man's life and should be his joy - defeat or victory is in the hands of God." 
"We are surrendering all that is ours for the struggle." A young girl said, 
"The police are trying to wipe us out but we shall fight back until the last 
one of us dies - there is no retreating - it is do or die." The struggle had 
quite clearly transcended the frustrations of Soweto and the "poison" (as 13
13) Undertaken with financial support from the Urban Foundation. The group 
interviews were conducted by experienced African group interviewers. 
Fifty young people were involved.
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they put it) of Bantu Education: "Our lives and aspirations are not Soweto
but humanity." "Our blood will be manure for liberation."
The demonstrations, it seems, were sustained more by inner commitment 
than by any sense of practical strategy. In the group discussions, some 
references were made to help from other African countries, but this was clearly 
not a general expectation. Some discussants took encouragement from the very 
violence they had encountered: "Another thing that makes us hopeful is the
very fact that these Dutchboys are resorting to violence; basically that is 
a sign that these Afrikaners are lacking their senses .... we are just going 
to work on their feelings and we will get what we want." In other words, the 
police action was interpreted as fear and panic. More generally, though, the 
struggle was somehow seen as self-vindicating and cumulative, bound to succeed 
in the long run.
Consequences of the demonstrations have been diverse. Firstly, the 
point has to be made that at no stage was "law and order" throughout the 
country threatened. Many people were killed, but the South African police 
actually used only a small extent of their coercive potential. If mass demon­
strations had actually threatened the police on a large scale, then the death 
toll would have been infinitely greater. The demonstrations, if they were a 
bid for immediate liberation or for the commencement of a violent overthrow 
of the system, were a tragic failure. Professor Noel Manganyi, the African 
analyst of Black Consciousness, has termed the demonstrations a "dustbin 
revolution" - brave, moving, but tragically unable to dent the facade of 
white physical security and control.
Yet, there was a response from the authorities, who must at least 
have been concerned about the effects of the disturbances on the economy. A 
commission of enquiry was appointed, the announcement of improvements to the 
system of education was hastened (including a decision to drop the label 
"Bantu" before "Education") and the authorities backed down on the issue of 
the medium of instruction. Furthermore, the government announced that long­
term leasehold purchase of houses would be allowed without the requirement of 
homeland citizenship, offering Africans more security of tenure in the town­
ships.^^ The Urban Bantu Councils^^ were to be replaced by a form of elected *15
1*0 Some years ago, the government terminated the system of leasehold purchase 
on the grounds that Africans in "White" urban areas were temporary 
sojourners. Recently, leasehold purchase was reinstated, but subject to the 
condition that the purchaser accepted homeland citizenship. It was this 
condition which was withdrawn.
15) The Urban Bantu Councils were purely advisory bodies and appeared never to 
enjoy much legitimacy among Africans. They were elected, but percentage 
polls were usually very low - 15-25%.
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representation, giving urban Africans a measure of increased responsibility 
for their own local affairs - the so-called "Community Councils". It is 
significant, though, that full freehold ownership rights in the townships in 
•white' areas have not been granted, nor have full powers of local £ca ernment.
Another consequence of the disturbances was a rather ugly event.
Some migrant workers, living in a hostel in Soweto, returned home to find
that part of their hostel had been set alight. Elsewhere, migrant workers
clashed at a railway station with youthful picketers who attempted to prevent
them from going to work. Accounts have it that the migrants were joined by
police plants who egged the mob on to violence, and that the migrants were
given marijuana.16  ^ Events escalated, and about 1000 migrant workers (mainly
Zulus, but apparently including others as well) went on the rampage, destroying
houses in their search for scholars. Thirty-five young Soweto people were
killed in the violence which followed. One should consider that even if there
was initial police instigation, this order of violence could not have occurred
unless there was a basis of friction and mutual lack of sympathy existing 
. 17)between migrants and township youth. In Durban, when black university 
students staged a march in solidarity with the Soweto demonstrators, some 
African factory workers assisted the police in detaining the students; 
factory workers in Durban are mainly migrants as well.
How should these disturbances be understood? Quite obviously, the 
issue of the medium of instruction was merely the factor which finally pre­
cipitated the unrest. Of more fundamental importance was the quality of 
Bantu Education, and the general view among youth that it is designed to 
prepare them for second-class status in the society. Yet Bantu Education is
also symbolic, for the youth, of the wider system itself. As Hanf and
18 )Vierdag point out, young blacks are more or less completely segregated from 
the wider society. Their parents at least have contact with whites through 
working in white areas. Young scholars and the unemployed youth move in a 
world which is limited to that of the ghetto-like existence of the urban 
blacks. Their only contact with the wider system of Apartheid, which creates
16) Chief Buthelezi claims that he has been given reliable accounts of the 
police intervention.
17) Migrants often complain that they are viewed by townspeople as uneducated, 
as primitive and as a negative influence in the townships.
18) Theodor Hanf and Gerda Vierdag, op. oit.
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that existence, is in their dealings with the township administration and their 
experience of the school system. Their frustrations become focused on both, 
but particularly on the educational system, because it is most intimately 
associated with their life-chances and their chances of escape from the poverty 
of township life.
There are, of course, other factors which also help to explain the
phenomenon of the township disturbances, and which are particularly relevant
to an understanding of why the demonstrations were more or less limited to
teenagers and young adults. Mid-1976 was a time of rising unemployment and
particularly of black youth unemployment. Not only must this to some extent
have clouded young people's views and expectations for their own futures, but
it was probably aggravated by the fact that the unemployment set in after a
period of economic prosperity, when black wages and job-opportunities improved
as never before (1970-1975). The disillusionment of seeing so many of their
friends unemployed must have been all the worse for the contrast. As Gurr
says in his excellent treatise on civil unrest, setbacks after periods of
19)rapid advance are particularly dangerous in any society.
Another factor feeding the flames of discontent was probably the 
homeland citizenship clauses introduced by the government with regard to the 
right to home ownership on leasehold. Most younger urban Africans have never 
even seen the homelands, and a law which coerced their parents (and therefore 
themselves, if under age) to assume homeland citizenship, must have been 
extremely ominous in its implications for their future. Then again, events in 
Southern Africa, like the withdrawal of Portugal from Mozambique and Angola, 
and much talk of settlements in Rhodesia and South West Africa, may have raised 
political expectations, or at least produced a climate of optimism; a sense of 
new opportunities for change.
The school system itself, however, may have heightened tensions. 
Notoriously overcrowded for years, there was a 52% increase in enrolment in 
secondary schools in Soweto in 1975. Considering the generally poor performance 
of the educational system for Africans and the intense anxiety and strain that
this must cause highly ambitious young people, a sharp increase in the pressure
■* ' 20) on the system could very well heighten frustrations to critical levels.
19) T.D. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970.
20) According to 1975 enrolment figures, only 0,75% of pupils in Bantu Educa­
tion were in Forms 4 or 5, and 4,6% were in Forms 2, 3, 4 and 5 combined. 
Financial Mail, June 25th, 1976, p.1112.
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It is factors like these which have to be considered in any assessment of why
the disturbances should have occurred in 1976. They are factors which operated
against a background of more general frustrations, however. Conditions in the
21)townships are generally very poor indeed. What is particularly noteworthy 
is the fact that the townships allow little opportunity for teenagers and 
young people to develop the kind of diversionary subculture (a leisure and 
play ethic) which, in more normal societies, tends to depoliticise young 
people. In South African townships, young people have most of the frustra­
tions of their elders, without the counter-balancing and stabilising influence 
of jobs to keep, families to maintain, etc. Finally, it should be observed 
that the way in which ad hoc informal leadership emerged in the situation of 
the disturbances, suggests that the Black Consciousness movement, and, in 
particular, the school-based organization, the South African Students'
Movement, had succeeded in creating avenues of communication and a sense of
22)cohesion, at least among certain echelons of the youth.
The youth resistance continued for a long time after the initial 
violence. There was an almost complete boycott of certain key schools in 
Soweto, Pretoria and elsewhere, which broke down only at the end of 1977. 
Hundreds of youngsters have fled the country to seek a future (or military 
training) elsewhere and the process continues. The youth in the demonstrations 
displayed an almost puritanical fervour (opposing the use of alcohol, opposing 
consumerism amcng their parents, etc.),which suggests that the commitment to 
maintain the resistance without immediate reward is powerful. Furthermore, 
while perhaps a majority of the participants were not necessarily highly 
politically motivated at the outset of the disturbances, the confrontations 
with the police and the publicity no doubt have had an almost boundless 
politicising effect.
IV. Black Labour on the Move:
Another black movement with possible political implications is the 
non-registered African trade union movement. Africans are not regarded as 
employees in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act governing labour 
relations in South Africa, and, as a consequence, Africans may not be members
21) See, for example, the proceedings of the inaugural conference of the 
Urban Foundation, Johannesburg, November-December, 1976.
22) Hanf and Vierdag, op. oit.
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of White, Coloured or Asian unions, nor may they negotiate formally within 
the official Industrial Council system of negotiation and dispute-settlement.
In formal terms, labour relations affecting Africans are governed by the 
system of "Works" and "Liaison" committees which operate within individual 
industrial firms. Africans, however, are not prohibited from forming non- 
registered, informal unions.
African labour activity has a long history. Well-known strikes 
occurred as early as 1918 and 1919. In 1920, for example, up to 70,000 black 
mineworkers went on strike. White mineworkers assisted management in keeping 
the mines going. In 1919, Clements Kadalie formed the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers' Union (I.C.U.) . Initially, the Industrial and Commercial 
Workers' Union was successful in negotiating improvements in wages at govern­
ment level. By 1928, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union had nearly 
30,000 members. Organizational problems and lack of recognition by the 
registered movement and by the employers and authorities led to its eventual 
disintegration. The Natal branch, under George Champion, separated from the 
parent body to form the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (Natal), 
and was remarkably successful for a time. Champion, a man close to the people, 
was no ordinary unionist, inasmuch as he attempted to solve a wide range of 
community problems apart from labour issues. His movement, however, also 
disintegrated, because of lack of formal recognition and administration 
difficulties.
«
After the decline of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, 
a number of African unions and union co-ordination bodies continued to exist, 
and the movement underwent a resurgence after the great depression. Diffi­
culties were great, however. While some unions received assistance from 
registered unions, and whereas the government Wage Boards were not always 
unsympathetic, no union movement can be guaranteed of success without
sufficient recognition from employers to have at least stop-order facilities
23)for union dues. There were also severe problems of factionalism and 
ideological cleavage. Then the South African Council of Trade Unions 
(S.A.C.T.U.) emerged as a non-racial body co-ordinating both some registered 
and some African unions. By 1961, it had 46 affiliated unions and a membership
23) For a brief account, see M.A. du Toit, South African Trade Unions:
Historyj Legislation, Policy, McGraw Hill, 1976.
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of over 50,000. It was, in part, politically motivated-} a 
reasonable stance, since the position of the African worker is, in 
large measure, the result of his political exclusion. However, 
the political stance had the inevitable consequence of large- 
scale bannings of leaders and the movement disintegrated.
Government action, the unreceptiveness of employers, differences 
with regard to strategy vis-a-vis the white unions and the 
hostility of most white unions led to a further decline in 
African union strength and cohesion. By 1970, only two African 
unions remained.
In 1972, African wages in industry were lagging 
badly behind increases in the cost of living. The so-called 
Poverty Datum Line had become a popular concept. The Urban 
Training Project, a moderate labour education body, had started to 
operate in the Transvaal. A resurgence of labour consciousness 
appeared to have taken place among African workers, and sporadic 
informal strikes started occuring at an increased tempo.
In 1973, a spate of strikes occurred in Durban and 
surrounding areas, which left industry crippled for close on two 
weeks. Over 70,000 Africans went on strike and, here and there, 
were joined by Indian workers. This combined strike action 
proved to be a signal event, particularly since small but 
significant concessions were granted across the board by most 
employers, and the government ordered a review of minimum wage 
levels for unskilled workers. The strikes were economically rather 
than politically motivated, and the strikers displayed remarkable 
cohesion and self-discipline. The strikes spread by a process
24)of example and active encouragement of one worker group by another.
Both the African National Congress abroad and the 
Black Consciousness movement, directly or indirectly, took some 
credit for these strikes. The weight of evidence as well as 
detailed discussions with African labour leaders, however, 
suggest that the leadership for the strikes emerged within the 
situation and that the strikes represented the outcome of a 
groundswell of popular grievances.
24) See Institute for Industrial Education, The Durban Strikes, 
197Sy Favan Press, 1974.
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After the strikes, a new incentive existed for the establishment 
of unions. White and other non-African assistance was forthcoming from 
the Urban Training Project, the University Wages Commissions and from 
two or three registered unions. In Natal, a co-ordinating body, the 
Trade Union Advisory Committee, was formed. By mid-1979, 20 African 
unions were in existence, with a claimed membership of nearly 90,000.
Since 1979, some by now traditional impediments to African 
union success have become manifestly obvious again. With the exception 
of hesitant responses by a very small number of foreign firms, employers are 
unwilling to recognise the unions, and some degree of recognition is essential 
for success. From 1973 onwards employers have been strongly encouraged by 
the government to base their labour relations policies on either "Works" or 
more especially, ^Liaison" committees; these committees representing at best 
a form of "house" or company organisation and at worst, and perhaps more 
typically, little more than consultative bodies. Both forms of committees, 
although elected and offering undoubted possibilities for improved communication 
in industry, fragment an industry-wide labour force, are vulnerable to 
manipulation by management and, inasmuch as they discourage the recognition of 
unions, impede the development of bargaining strength. Furthermore, ideological 
differences, partly symbolised by differing attitudes towards the goals and 
ideals of earlier labour movements have made co-operation between sections of 
the African trade union miovement difficult. Also, there has been persistent 
surveillance by the security police. Non-African trade union educators and 
union leaders in particular, have been banned, including individuals,who were 
earnestly striving to establish a practical basis of understanding between 
unions and management, like the Chairman and Secretary of the Urban Training 
Project. Organisational difficulties have arisen, partly as a result of 
bannings. Recently, there has been some internal dissent in the African union 
movement in Durban. Furthermore, the Black Consciousness labour movement, 
(B.A.W.U.) has at times been unhelpful by accusing white personnel in the 
black unions of paternalism and exploitation, but without doing much organising 
itself. The unions in some cases have become somewhat unduly committee- 
dominated with poorly articulated popular participation. Above all, however, 
the economic recession from 1975 onwards and consequent mounting unemployment 
has weakened the confidence of African workers. Despite considerable
25) The author was from late 1973 to 1977 on the council and later chairman 
of the Institute for Industrial Education, a trade union education body 
within the structure of unregistered unions in Natal. The comments 
offered are based on this experience and also on discussions with trade 
unionists in the movement.
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encouragement and concrete assistance from abroad, the African unions appear 
to be struggling to maintain levels of activity and organisation, At the 
time of writing, however, it would seem that there is sufficient organisational 
skill available within the African unions themselves and enough .interest 
among workers to make survival a real possibility, and of great import for 
the future, if and when economic recovery commences.
V. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and "Inkatha".
Another development of major significance has been the emergence of 
Inkatha yeNkululeko yeSiwe, the "National Cultural Liberation Movement", 
under the leadership of Chief Mangosutho Gatsha Buthelezi. Originally brought 
into existence by the Zulu king, Dinizulu, in 1928, it aimed at promoting the 
cultural traditions of the Zulu people, their national solidarity, as well as 
a wider unity of African people in South Africa. Chief Buthelezi had revived 
the organisation before 1973, but in 1975, he and other leaders re-shaped the', 
goals of the organisation to make it more relevant to the political and social 
challenges of the day. Inkatha is clearly a mobilisation organisation with a 
very strong political flavour. Its colours, songs and slogans are those of the 
A.N.C. (with minor differences in the insignia), an affinity which should be 
seen in the light of the fact that Chief Buthelezi is an ex-member of the 
A.N.C. - he served in the Youth League, and was expelled from Fort Hare 
University for his associations and activities in connection with the A.N.C.
He is also recognised as having been a lieutenant of Chief Albert Luthuli, 
former President of the A.N.C.
The aims of the organisation are 1) to promote cultural liberation; 
in other words, to overcome dependency and to instil a sense of pride and 
independence in Africans - a prominent member, Gibson Thula, Its representative 
in the Transvaal, says, "Call it 'Black Consciousness' if you like." 2) • It .'.also 
aims at promoting community development along lines of self-help and self- 
reliance, in order to combat problems of underdevelopment and poor morale. 
Furthermore, 3) it aims at working towards a change in the educational system 
for blacks in South Africa, and 4) the abolition of race discrimination.
Most importantly, however, 5) it stands for the full incorporation of blacks
26) At present a government commission, the "Wiehahn Commission", is
investigating policy alternatives with regard to unregistered unions. 
Rumours suggest that African unions are to be recommended for official 
recognition, albeit within a framework of close government control.
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into political decision-making or, otherwise stated, majority rule in South 
Africa.
The precise aims of Inkatha in this regard must be judged from the
statements of its national president, Chief Buthelezi, who regards his role
in Inkatha as more important than his position as Chief Minister in the
KwaZulu cabinet. "Before we do anything, we need to organise ourselves, into
a disciplined body. Vie need to come together to support each other, plan with
each other and act with each other." "As this movement (Inkatha) gains momentum,
we shall produce a groundswell which will bring about change in South Africa."
27)"It is a movement of ordinary men and women in ordinary walks of life."
The strategy is largely reflected in the above quotes - mobilisation and
solidarity at the grass roots before any specific political activity is
undertaken. Activity should follow upon a "groundswell". It should also
follow upon the establishment of political discipline. "With discipline we
28 )can stall this whole country a couple of days." As regards the process of
political development, the model is one of the development of interest-based
organisations as a means of achieving political articulation: government "does
not relate to the masses directly as it does to the organisations and associations
which are important to the people." "Blacks should use all available energy in
forming associations..... with achievable goals around clusters of vested
interests which hang together naturally." "..... the govemability of a
society which has emerged from..... rapid and radical social change could
easily depend on the kind of organisations and associations which were developed
29)prior to and during the transition period." A problem common in the
third world, and one which has contributed to the failure of the democratic
accountability of politicians all over Africa, has been the relative lack of
organisations at the middle range which both sanction the actions of politicians
30)and provide feedback from the population. Clearly, Buthelezi aims at 
cross-cutting cleavages of interest which will provide a balance in the influences 
on government and enable political goals to be fed into effective organisational 
networks.
With regard to the political goals of Inkatha and Buthelezi, the
27) M.G. Buthelezi, in a speech at Soweto, 14/3/1976.
28) Speech by M.G. Buthelezi at a Shaka Day Rally, September 24, 1977.
29) M.G. Buthelezi, speech on Namibia Day, Windhoek, 25/9/1976.
30) See for example, S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernisation, Protest and Change3 
Engelwood Clifts, Prentice Hall, 1966.
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picture is complex at this stage, and it is probably premature to draw any
final conclusions. Certain basic principles are emerging, however. Firstly,
there is an awareness that grass-roots interests should prevail: "It is not
the role of political leadership to impose on a people a political system
31)which that leadership considers to be an ideal." Secondly, there is a
discemable trend in favour of a "one-party democracy" as the basis of policy
goals. On the issue of opposition parties in KwaZulu, Buthelezi has expressed
doubts, arguing, inter alia, that "poverty is too near the bone", implying
that in situations of underdevelopment and inequality, opposition parties
can too easily exploit the felt deprivation of people in an irresponsible way;
or, alternatively stated, the required basic consensus over the rules of the
political game is absent in situations of sharp deprivation,., indicating the
32 )possibility of instability in two-party or multi-party systems. "......the
political leadership a la Westminster is the politics of the practical in
33)multi-option circumstances." It is not yet clear whether Buthelezi would
regard a non-racial South Africa as a situation of "multiple options". A
former Secretary General of Inkatha, Professor S.M. Bengu, has questioned
the applicability of a multi-party democracy in a non-racial South Africa,
suggisting the by now virtually traditional African one-party democracy as his
34 )view of the appropriate political form.
Yet, one gathers that the final political concept has not yet emerged.
"There is in South Africa no blueprint for the society we are striving to
establish." "There is a very real need for a Pan Africanist conference in
35)which the nature of South Africa of the future is debated." The range of 
options entertained by Chief Buthelezi has tended to narrow over the past four 
years. In 1974, he offered a fairly detailed set of proposals, a non­
proportional form of federalism as an intermediate stage in a gradualist
36 )transition to majority rule. The "offer", not unpredictably, was disregarded
31) See Buthelezi, op. cit.
32) L.Schlemmer and T. Muil, "Social and Political Change in the African 
Areas: A Case Study of KwaZulu!' in L. Thompson and J. Butler, Change in 
Contemporary South Africa, Berkley and Los Angeles, University of California 
Press, 1975, p. 136.
33) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at the University of Cape Town, 8/9/1976.
34) S.M. Bengu, address at the Annual Council Meeting of the South African 
Institute of Race Relations, Durban, January, 1976.
35) M.G. Buthelezi, Speech at Portland University, Oregon, U.S.A., 1/3/1977.
36) M.G. Buthelezi, White and Black Nationalism, ethnicity and the Future of 
the Homelands, Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 
1974.
20.
by the present government, despite calls for a response froth govemment-
37 )supporting newspapers. Since then, the climate in Southern Africa has
become less favourable for concessions. "I must say now, and I must say with
considerable emphasis, that such reconciliatory offers as were contained in
my federal formula will be increasingly difficult to offer in the Southern
38 )Africa that is now emerging." "It is too late in South Africa’s political
day to think of the gradualism which was one of the whites' options. Majority
rule will have to stand or fall on the preparations already made," "Whether
we like it or not, and for good or evil, the generic foróe of politics in
South Africa today is the movement toward majority rule. - The rejection of
this option is in fact nothing other than the election .-to solvé the country's
39)political ills by violence." Majority rule, then, has clearly and unambig­
uously been stated as the goal. What of provisions for the protection of 
minority rights? Br. S.M. Bengu has been clear in stating his view that the
41)position pf "interest groups" should be protected. Very recently, Chief 
Buthelezi has once again placed emphasis on the possibility of a federal
arrangement, but without the gradualism suggested in 1974. ".... .1 stand
for majority rule of like-minded South Africans regardless of race, colour 
or creed (but) I do not know where Mr. Muil (a journalist) gets it that I am 
committed to majority rule within a unitary state and not within a federal
42)state." Buthelezi maintains that the final form of government in an open 
South Africa can only be determined at a National Convention.
Indications are available as regards economic ideologies which areV“*emerging in Inkatha. Buthelezi -has "Said that a requirement for a political 
system in a transitional situation in/South Africa "is that it makes radical 
redistribution of wealth possible, while it facilitates increased productivity." 
"I am convinced that the requisite degree of state control is essential in
both-the productive process and in the distribution of wealth..... Experience
has taught us that when a classical free enterprise model is tampered with to 
giv^ selective state control, this is no more than political manipulation of 
the underprivileged by the privileged." "Nowhere in Southern Africa has a
37) Schlemmer and Muil, op. cit., pp. 131, 132.
38) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at the Jabulani Amphitheatre, Soweto, 14/3/1976.a
39) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at the University of Cape Town, 8/9/1976.
40) S.M. Bengu, op. cit.
41) Tom Puff, "A Huge Zulu Force on the Move", The Star, 6/8/1977, p. 16 
(quoting Gibson Thula, KwaZulu Urban Representative).
42) Letter by Chief Buthelezi to the Natal biereuxy, 20/9/1978, in response 
to an article on black political views by Tim Muil of the Natal Mercury.
43) M.G. Buthelezi, speech on Namibia Day, Windhowk, 25/9/1976. (my emphasis)
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capitalist free enterprise system been able to distribute wealth and power in 
such a way that political stability has been assured." The views expressed 
by Buthelezi suggest that not only industry, but also other bodies relevant 
to class relations, should be subject to state control, like trade unions:
"..... Black unions could well be instrumental in establishing an elitist
class of skilled workers who have a vested interest in maninaining the status 
quo." "Trade unionism needs to have a broadly-based responsibility towards 
the community it serves and it needs to develop a sense of commitment within
45)the overall strategy which has been adopted by a wide range of organisations."
There is a welcome absence of superficial Marxixt sloganeering which
one encounters elsewhere in Southern Africa, but nonetheless, the analysis
tends toward the one-party state socialist model. The Secretary General of
Inkatha, Dr. Bengu, has been rather more general in his prescriptions,
46)calling for "African Socialism".
In one of the very recent speeches by Buthelezi, there is clearly
a prescription for an economy based on a mixed socialist and capitalist model,
but with considerable state control. In enunciating the principles of Inkatha,
Buthelezi said, "..... we believe it essential that all men join hands and
enter into a partnership with the state to effect the greatest possible
redistribution of wealth commensurate with maximising the productivity of
commerce, trade and industry whether state controlled or privately owned.....
state control......(is) essential for the utilisation of land, water and
power in the interests of the economy and in the interests of developing
47)underdeveloped areas and populations." From this quote, it would seem 
that state control of basic resources is envisaged, while privately-owned 
industry would be allowed or encouraged, subject to the state exercising 
considerable control, particularly in order to achieve an optimal redistribution 
of wealth. There is also a good deal of pragmatism in the stance, like, for 
example, an acceptance, albeit critical and selective, of the need for Western 
investment in South Africa and KwaZulu, on the grounds that the creation of 
employment is a high priority: "In these circumstances I cannot bring myself
44) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at Portland University, Oregon, U.S.A., 1/3/1977.
45) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at Oregon. Ibid.
46) S.M. Bengu, a-dress at the Annual Council Meeting of the South African 
Institute of Race Relations, January, 1976 (including contributions in 
discussion).
47) M.G. Buthelezi, "Living from Crisis to Crisis", speech delivered at 
Jabulani Amphitheatre, Soweto, 29/1/1978. (my emphasis)
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to be an ideological puritan. , ^ 8)'
Buthelezi is not racist in outlook. He has strong elements of 
a Black (African) Consciousness orientation, as we have seen, and Inkatha's 
membership is not open to non-Africans at this stage, but it is claimed that 
an open membership is envisaged for the future when circumstances are more 
appropriate. There appears to be a complete acceptance of the role which 
whites can play in a new South Africa: "Blacks in South Africa will have to 
accept my commitment to whites, just as whites will have to accept my 
commitment to blacks," "... I do not view whites as expendable expatriots. 
They come from the very soil of South Africa. This is the land of their 
birth and they have a right to be here. There will be no political solution
ii9)in which they are not active partners.’1 Apart from this noteworthy
idealism, there is also pragmatism: "Another ingredient in a realistic
approach to bringing about ... a better society ... is the recognition that
whites are not dispensable. Commerce and industry could not come to a
50)near-standstill even for a short period of time."
Inkatha^^has been effectively operating for only roughly three 
and a half years, and during this period has experienced rapid growth. Its 
current membership is roughly 200 000, which makes it the largest black 
political organisation in South African history. It is also a remarkably 
cross-sectional organisation: some 29% of its members are under 18 years 
of age, these being based mainly on the recruitment of groups at secondary 
schools - it has a growing number of women's brigades and half of its 
membership is now female, and all occupational groups are represented - 
subsistence farmers, workers, white-collar employees, civil servants, pro­
fessionals and businessmen. The growth in its geographitcal spread can be 
assessed from the fact that in February 1977 it consisted of 300 branches
48) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at the University of Williamete, Salem, 
U.SA., 23/2/1977. See also the position adopted by Mr. Gibson 
Thula in Duff's article in the "Star", op cit. Recently, Chief 
Buthelezi sharply condemned a call for sanctions against South 
Africa by exiled editor Donald Woods, Natal Mercuryj 30/1/1978.
49) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at Jan Smuts Holiday Inn on a Conference 
on Race Discrimination, 3-4/12/1976.
50) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at Portland University, op cit.
51) The information given in the ensuing pages has been furnished by 
officials in the organisation itself who are known to the author, 
or extracted from a fact paper compiled by Toni Tickton of the 
South African Institute of Race Relations (Information Sheet No. 1, 
18/11/1977) or obtained from Mr. Tim Muil, African Affairs 
Correspondent of the Ncctal Mercury who is closely acquainted with 
the organisation.
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while today, one and a half years later, there are no less than 946 branches.
It is a predominantly Natal-based organisation. Only 36 of its 
branches are located outside of Natal. Areas outside of Natal where it is 
a strong movement tend to be places where large numbers of Zulu-speaking 
people or people of Zulu origin are concentrated, like Soweto and the 
Witwatersrand for example (25 branches). Although no details on tribal 
affiliation of members are available the impression is gained that over 
95% of its membership is Zulu-speaking. It is still also mainly a rurally- 
based organisation. Only 203 of its 946 branches appear to be located in 
urban areas. However, the growth is presently concentrated in urban areas 
and the organisation as a whole, if it continues to develop, may- ulti­
mately have a balanced rural-urban distribution; a noteworthy point in 
its favour. Another positive feature of the organisation is the rapidly 
increasing involvement of youth. In tnid 19*76 orily 26 students and pupils 
attended the annual Inkatha youth-t^&ining course; in 1977, 400 and in 1978 
approximately 1 000 young people attended.
The structure of the organisation is in some respects fairly 
typical of party-political organisations throughout the world. The lowest 
level of organisation is the branch (or in the.case of youth members and 
women, the 'brigade'). A branch must have more than 30 members and it is 
related to local political boundaries, township wards or headmen's wards 
in rural areas. Branches and brigades are organised into Constituencies 
(in rural areas coinciding with a Chief's area of authority), which are 
in turn combined in a Regional body. At the head of the organisation is 
the Central Committee, comprising not less than 25 members, including the 
President, the Secretary General, 20 members elected at the annual General 
Conference (see below) and three members nominated by the President.
It differs from purely party-political organisations in two 
significant ways. Firstly, the activities of branches and brigades are 
not confined to political mobilisation; they are encouraged to undertake 
self-help development projects and organise community education programmes 
in family affairs, nutrition, health, etc. Therefore politics and attenpts 
at community development are combined; a form or organisation based on 
models existing elsewhere in third world countries like China and Tanzania, 
to name but two. Secondly, Inkatha is formally interlocked with the 
government of KwaZulu; once again a feature characteristic of some third 
world one-party systems. Ultimate decisions on policy both for Inkatha
areand (in certain respects) for the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly 
formulated by the ’National Council'. This is the supreme body and it 
comprises the Central Committee of Inkatha, the Legislative Assembly of 
KwaZulu and representatives of specialised functions within Inkatha.
Another feature of this interlocking of structures is the fact that the 
Kind of the Zulu nation, His Majesty Paramount Chief Goodwill Zwelethini, 
titular head of the self-governing Zulu region, is Patron of Inkatha.
The major gathering of the year is the Annual General Conference, at 
which the really critical broad policy decisions are taken, and which 
essentially comprises the National Council. A further feature of the 
interlocking system is the fact that KwaZulu civil servants and teachers 
can become members of Inkatha (and in fact are encouraged to do so). For 
a while there was uncertainty among civil servants and teachers about the 
position, since South African civil servants are not formally allowed to 
be members of political parties, but in the KwaZulu case the policy of 
civil servant participation has been formally adopted.
Hence the system is essentially similar to that pertaining in 
many one-party states in independent Africa and the Third World generally 
where government, party and mobilisation activities tend to coincide. This 
has important implications to which reference will be made presently.
Inkatha has experienced spectacular growth, as has already been 
noted. Its rapid ’take-off’ in these early stages appears to have been 
due in large measure to the active cooperation of tribal Chiefs, esta­
blishing branches within their constituencies. The Chiefs, being ex- 
officio members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, could fairly readily 
be persuaded at high level to embark on the mobilisation of their con­
stituents. There have been suggestions that some Chiefs felt ambivalent 
or threatened by the movement, but on the other hand the organisation pro­
vides the Chiefs with a way of becoming involved as key figures in a modern 
political organisation; an entirely appropriate move in a population be­
coming increasingly sceptical of traditional political processes.
This initial tribal 'take-off* accounts for the strong rural 
base of Inkatha. Subsequent support appears to have been won on the basis 
of popular appeal, particularly among women, and on the
52)
52) As is probably known to readers, KwaZulu is a party self-governing 
'homeland’ established by the present South African Government in 
its pursuance of its policy of Separate Development.
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enthusiasm of some teachers in enrolling youth. Enthusiasm to join among men
is less striking but there is considerable support among rank
and file African workers for the cause of Inkatha. Chief Buthelezi's own
popularity spearheads the appeal of the organisation itself. For some years
he has been drawing massive audiences of over 10 000 people at a time when
53)speaking in urban areas, both in Natal and Soweto. In one Inkatha
Rally in Kwa Mashu on April 24, 1978, Chief Buthelezi drew a crowd of
54)80 000. A recent study in Soweto, Pretoria and Durban revealed that
Chief Buthelezi, in these three important areas combined, had more support
than any oher black leader or political grouping, free or imprisoned.
Some 44% named Buthelezi as their most admired political figure, and an
additional 7% mentioned him as a 'homeland' leader who was also a genuine
political leader. Compared with this roughly 50% support, imprisoned or
exiled A.N.C leaders gained 22% mention, other 'homeland' leaders 18%,
55)Pan African Congress leaders 7% and Black Consciousness figures 6%.
These results have to be qualified. The selection of Pretoria, Soweto 
and Durban under-represented Xhosa-speaking people who, from the results 
seem to support Buthelezi and A.N.C/P.A.C leaders in roughly equal 
measure. Had the Cape urban areas been included, Buthelezi's relative 
position would have fallen somewhat but he would still have emerged ahead 
of other groupings in overall terms. Another qualification is that the 
study, conducted in early 1977 preceded the rise to prominence of certain 
urban leaders in Soweto known as the 'Committee of Ten'. Since this 
group's predecessor group, the 'Black Parents Association' also composed 
of prominent people, did not achieve significant mention in the survey 
question about the 'most admired leader', the Committee of Ten would not 
necessarily have altered the results meaningfully as they apply to rank 
and file support for a national leader.
It needs to be stated here that notwithstanding the dominant 
position of Chief Buthelezi, the degree of support for the A.N.C is re­
markable since the organisation has been banned for 17 years.
The study by Hanf et al also explored responses to Inkatha.
Among the respondents of higher socio-economic status,positive and
53) See Schlemmer and Muil, op cit.
54) The lowest newspaper estimate of the crowd has been taken.
55) Theodor Hanf, et al3 op cit3 Chapter 11.
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negative attitudes toward Inkatha were a ratio of 2 to 3 in Soweto,but 
roughly to 2 in Durban with Pretoria evenly balanced. Among the rank 
and file the ratio’s of positive to negative responses were some 2 to 1 
in Soweto and 6 to 1 in Durban (an insufficient number of rank and file 
respondents in Pretoria knew of Inkatha at that stage to provide stable 
patterns). Obviously Buthelezi supporters are overwhelmingly in favour 
of Inkatha, but what is noteworthy in the results is that roughly half 
of the A.N.C supporters are also in favour of Inkatha. This seems to 
suggest that Inkatha has managed successfully to establish some continuity 
with the A.N.C in the minds of ordinary urban Africans, due no doubt to 
Buthelezi’s former membership of the A.N.C and the symbolism of a uniform 
resembling the A.N.C.
The strength and coherence of Inkatha received a considerable 
boost in the February 1978 elections for 55 seats in the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly. The organisation nominated candidates, held nomina­
tion contests and undertook pre-election voter education and campaigning.
This activity naturally brought Inkatha into great prominence and led to 
the rapid creation of new branches.
In 1974, the South African government rejected a request by the 
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly for powers to control opposition parties.
The matter has not been pursued since. Nevertheless, no publicly orga­
nised opposition to Inkatha has yet emerged, and therefore Inkatha was the
only party in the elections. It was opposed by 23 independent candidates in 14 
of the 55 constituencies. In these constituencies Inkatha candidates
polled an average of 90% of the votes - thus overwhelming what opposition 
there was. This victory has to be seen in context, however. Only some 
50% of the eligible KwaZulu citizens registered for the elections, and 
in the contested seats, roughly 38% of the registered voters turned out 
to vote. Allowing for the fact that registration of voters was probably 
higher in the contested seats, the results on the face of it nonetheless 
do not suggest an overwhelming active electoral response to Inkatha.
On the other hand, for most people the results of the election were 
probably a foregone conclusion, lessening the amount of popular en­
thusiasm. Also, a 38% poll among poorly educated people, many of whom 
are not able to be influenced by the mass media is not insubstantial.
On balance, in the context of official black homeland and local authority 
politics in South Africa, the results should be taken as a demonstra­
tion of the powerfully dominant position of Inkatha in the political 
affairs of the Zulus.
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Inkatha demonstrated its capacity to exert political control 
at the local level in other ways as well during the elections. Most of 
the independent candidates found themselves constrained to declare their 
.loyalty to Inkatha; one prominent candidate in Durban loudly protested 
his mistake in standing as an independent, others seemed to withdraw 
from the elections at the last moment under informal Inkatha encouragement 
or pressure. There were numerous rumours of other kinds of pressures 
being brought to bear on independent candidates. All this is variously 
interpreted, but it seems to demonstrate a capacity on the part of Inkatha 
to exert control.
This control over local level political action is demonstrated 
in further ways. Inkatha has moved to exercise sanction over
teachers who do not mobilise Inkatha youth groups or encourage what isC M
seen to be the appropriate orientation among the youth. Inkatha and
the KwaZulu Government was and still is to some extent responsible for
preventing Soweto-type youth disturbances from spreading to Natal in
1976; the disturbances being viewed by Inkatha as an inappropriate and
57)premature strategy. Inkatha members form a security screen round 
their leader at public meetings and maintain a presence in order to dis­
courage any repetition of a well-reported fairly recent incident in which 
Chief Buthelezi was stoned by some members of the Black Consciousness 
Movement at the funeral of Robert Sobukwe, the P.A.C leader on March the 
12th, 1978. ’ Inkatha also is making attempts to instil a greater sense
of dedication and service among KwaZulu civil servants.
Broadly then, it would seem that Inkatha has gained very sub­
stantial support and recognition, and while by no means all the enrolled 
formal support is due to spontaneous action, Inkatha in other vrays is 
beginning to show a capacity to control local level leadership and poli­
tical action, certainly in KwaZulu. Increasingly it seems able to 
exercise the kind of sanctions it needs to; one of the prime requirements 
for mobilisation under adverse circumstances._________________________
56) See debate in KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Daily Newsj May 10,
1978.
57) See statement by Mr. Dhlomo, Councillor for Education, Natal 
Mereurys May 12, 1978.
See, for example, report on the Black Alliance Rally at Chatsworth, 
an Indian area, Daily Newes July 2*4, 1978.
58)
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A major point of criticism of Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha is
that the Chief and his political movement are divisive in black politics.
introducing an ethnic element into a struggle which for decades has been
waged by the A.N.C, the P.A.C and recently the Black Consciousness
Movement in the name of inter-ethnic solidarity. Another criticism is
that by operating from a base of homeland politics, Chief Buthelezi and
Inkatha, no matter how critical they may be of South African government
policy, lend credibility and substance to that policy, the more critical
they become the more they provide the policy with underserved legitimacy.
Most homeland leaders are referred to from time to time as 'stooges',
and Buthelezi, because he is relatively more successful than others, is
59)regarded by some blacks as the greatest traitor of all.
Does Buthelezi's stance ultimately strengthen Separate 
Development, and does Inkatha mobilise to this end, unintentionally?
Is the movement divisive?
Obviously, Buthelezi takes great pains to distantiate himself 
from the policy of the government and, consciously, is certainly no 
stooge. The quotes given from his speeches are evidence of this. We 
can do no better than quote Colin Legum, the distinguished British 
political commentator, on the rationale for operating within the frame­
work of Separate Development: "Whereas the Congresses (A.N.C., P.A.C.,
N.I.C.) had little effective grass-roots support in the reserves and 
only a precarious base in the urban areas, they (African Homeland 
politicians) now operate legally from substantial political bases within 
a constitutional framework. Leaders can now legally be deprived of their 
right to act as spokesmen for their designated constituencies only by an 
abrogation of the laws designed to establish Separate Development. 
Therefore, despite their lack of effective political power, they have 
been given unprecedented opportunities for political manoeuvre in their 
confrontation with the white establishment.6^
The fact remains, however, that Buthelezi, through his critical 
and indeed, at times, militant stance, must to some extent have made the 
omeland programme seem promising as the beginnings of a devolution of 
power and may even have created the impression in some minds that the
59) See opinions expressed in Hanf et al3 op cit.3 p.315-316, and see 
also Schlemmer and Muil, op cit.
60) Colin Legum, "Political Leadership in the Bantustans' , Third. Worlds 
Vol. 2, 1973, p. 17. Legum sees the "stooge" labels as both in­
sulting and misleading.
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government is busy outwitting itself; that, given time, it would fall 
victim to its own policies* This would be dangerous complacency for op­
ponents of the government, and therefore this aspect of Buthelezi*s 
strategy has to be assessed very carefully.
An assessment depends to a large extent on whether or not the 
"room for political manoeuvre" that Legum refers to will be used to 
achieve more in the way of meaningful change than it will improve the 
image of the homelands. This question boils down to the issue of the 
effectiveness of Inkatha, We have discussed the strategy, and judge­
ment can, in part, be based on the assessment of the likely medium and 
longer-range effects of mass-mobilisation. Yet here the second criti­
cism of Buthelezi and Inkatha is relevant; this being that Inkatha is 
essentially sectional or tribal in character, being based in KwaZulu.
As such, these critics would have it, Inkatha is, at best, limited in 
its capacity to mobilise, and at worst, divisive and a threat to African 
solidarity.
How may one assess this critique? Buthelezi retorts that,
"In character and spirit, Inkatha is not peculiarly Zulu or even 
peculiarly Natal," In any event, "There is nothing to stop us having a 
number of Inkathas which, because their structure .....  and their con­
stitution is similar, can join together in a movement towards liberation." 
"The bricks of Black Nationalism are many and varied. There are ethnic
groups, there are tribes, there are trade unions .....  and many others."
"Beyond any divisions which appear to be present in Black society, there 
is a unity based on a deep-rooted Black nationalism." "There is no Zulu 
freedom that is distinct from the Black man's freedom ....." "We hope
that our brothers throughout the length and breadth of this land will 
get out from the Apartheid strait-jacket ...... and set up Inkatha as we
have done."k^ Inkatha is open to membership by all Africans, as we have 
said, and its officials claim that support among non-Zulus is growing. 1 
The argument for Inkatha can be based on three possibilities; the first, 
that other groups may join the movement and transform it into a completely 
non-sectional programme; the second, that it could spawn other similar 
movements which could unite or co-operate, and the third, that Inkatha
61) M.G. Buthelezi, speech at Jabulani Amphitheatre, Soweto, 14/3/1976,
62) Duff, op oit. (the Star). There is also evidence that support for 
Buthelezi exists among A.N.C. members in exile, particularly among 
some in the Dar Es Salaam group of the A.N.C. (African Nationalists) 
- private correspondence to Buthelezi.
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alone, sectional or not, could spearhead the struggle and achieve wider 
support once success is attained.
Before assessing these possibilities, the issue of so-called 
"tribalism" perhaps deserves some comment. Obviously, an inward- 
looking, linguistic group loyalty or a chauvinistic communal identifi­
cation is divisive, and thoroughly counter-productive of black 
aspirations outside of certain homelands in South Africa. There are 
group feelings existing among sections of the South African population, 
however, which may be seen as nationalisms or at least as being very 
closely akin to nationalisms. Afrikaner nationalism is one. Zulu 
communal feeling, inter aliat is another contender. Few people are 
likely to dispute that a Swazi or Lesotho "nationalism" could or does 
exist. The difference in the nature of group feeling between, say, the 
Tswana-speaking people of Botswana, and the Zulus in Natal, may not begq\
all that different. ' Looking back in history, it seems obvious that 
the "Mfecane" of Shaka was a process of nation-building; a process 
whereby smaller units were being assimilated into a larger group, leading 
to a wider unity. It is typical of historical processes, described byC11\Ward, of conquest leading to "enlarged areas of cohesion". 7 It is 
interesting to speculate hypothetically (and no more than that) on the 
possibility that if a "national" cohesion exists among the Zulus, and 
if the entry of whites onto the scene in South Africa blocked further 
expansion of that area of cohesion, a powerful Zulu-based mobilisation 
organisation like Inkatha could carry the process further today. The 
South-West Africa Peoples’ Organisation (S.W.A.P.O.) in Namibia owes 
much to the initial impetus it enjoyed among the Owambo group in that 
territory, yet today it is perhaps dominant as a focus of political iden­
tification among all black Namibians.
Another process rooted in "tribal" feeling is an alternative 
(or complementary) possibility. This would be a "two-step" process 
whereby the immediate ethnic identification (say Zulu group feeling) 
provides the morale and the sense of pride and mission, while wider and
63) See also David Hammond Tooke, "Tribal cohesion and the incorporative 
process in the Transkei, South Africa" in R. Cohen and J. Middleton 
(eds) From Tribe to Nation in Africa, Philadelphia, 1970.
6i+) Barbara Ward, Five Ideas That Change the World, New York, 1959.
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more inclusive political goals, like African or black nationalism, 
provide the focus and aim of mobilisation. This is essentially what 
Buthelezi appears to be suggesting when he calls for other Inkathas 
which could unite. This is perhaps the more realistic alternative.
We should remember that, unlike Afrikaner nationalism, African national­
ism is largely the result of reaction to white domination. Prior to 
white colonialism, no wider national consciousness existed. It is 
therefore a racial or political phenomenon, without necessarily having 
the deep-seated emotional appeal at the grass-roots which springs from 
feelings of in-group identity and affinity. The Zulus, on the other 
hand, may have this more "primordial" in-group feeling - as Sundkler 
says of Zulus: "Their history is an ever-present fact in their lives,
ce \moulding their outlook." ' In earlier research, conducted in 1972, 
the authors found among Africans in Durban no clash between strong Zulu 
pride and an identification with the political cause of African 
nationalism. ' In fact, the former may, as it were, have added fuel 
tc the latter.
These observations on "tribalism" have been made simply to 
suggest that those who insist that all forms of ethnic identification 
among Africans in South Africa weaken the cause of black opposition, 
may be presenting far too oversimple a view of the matter. An intrinsic 
black identity, which is more than a reaction to White domination, even 
though it might differ from region to region, may be very important in­
deed for mass mobilisation in opposition to the present order in South 
Africa.
. At a more pragmatic level the danger of disunity and divisiveness 
appears to be somewhat minimised by attempts by Buthelezi and others to forge 
a unity across ethnic lines. In 1976 Chief Buthelezi, Professor Ntsanwisi, 
Chief Minister of Gazankulu and Dr. Phatudi of Lebowa met about 50 leading 
black politicians and leaders in Soweto to establish the 'Black Unity 
Front1, aimed, inter alia, at establishing a disciplined black community 
and to work for the emergence of true black leadership. The township 
disturbances and subsequent government action against urban black leader­
ship undermined this initiative, but Chief Buthelezi more recently has 
entered into a pact with the Coloured Labour Party and the Indian Reform
65) B.G.M.bSundkler, The Christian Ministry in Africa^Uppsala, 1960, p.102.
66) L. Schlemmer, op cit.
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Party, in order to strive for unity of purpose among all unenfranchised 
people. The joint movement called the ’Black Alliance' has subsequently 
been joined by leaders of the Swazi, Basotho, Qua Qua and Gazankulu 
homelands.
A problem with these attempts to establish unity, however, is 
that the lack of power in key decision-making tends to mean that alliances 
among black groups are little more than symbolic gestures of solidarity. 
There is little that is concrete which unity fronts can achieve and some 
tangible gains are essential to the continued morale and solidarity of 
the movements. Furthermore, there is also, for black unity, the ever­
present danger that key homelands like Lebowa or Gazankulu may opt for 
independence as a second-best option.
The issue of black unity, however important it may be, perhaps 
should not be the only major criterion by which a black political movement 
in South Africa today is judged. Potential effectiveness, assessed in 
terms of bargaining power at the political level, is as important if not 
more important. No unity front will survive a long period of political 
ineffectiveness, because the leadership will simply not command re­
sources and power with which to dispense the patronage and impose the 
discipline which will maintain coherence. Effective unity is possibly 
more likely to follow a demonstration of effectiveness from a political 
movement, even if that effectiveness is built on a sectional base.
It is perhaps in this perspective that Inkatha should be judged. 
The notion of bargaining power is certainly prominent in the formulation 
of ideas at leadership level. Buthelezi has said "The machinery of 
Inkatha has provision for discipline. With discipline we can stall
cn\
this whole country for a couple of days.'" The notion of ’stalling* 
is a guarded reference to the potential bargaining power which inheres in 
the African domination of the labour force. Recently Inkatha has de­
clared a strategy of involving itself in the affairs of industry in en­
couraging the observance of codes of employment practice (the U.S.
’Sullivan Code’, the E.E.C Code and the Urban Foundation/Saccola Code’ 
all aimed at encouraging progressive employment practices in South African 
industry) and of involving itself in African labour. This type of
67) Speech by M.G. Buthelezi at a Shaka Day Rally, September 24th, 1977.
68) See inter alia speech by M.G. Buthelezi at a Black Alliance Rally, 
Chatsworth, July 24th, 1978.
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involvement, which in the current climate of industrial reform, is realis­
tic and likely to bear fruit, holds the possibility of winning very sub­
stantial membership or support and commitment for Inkatha among the African 
working class, and this, more than any other internal strategy, spells 
bargaining power. But, as will be argued in the concluding remarks, it 
does not necessarily imply an ultimate confrontation or strategies of 
disruption.
Perhaps one may sum up and say that the course of black poli­
tical movements and action in the seventies repeats the lessons of the 
early sixties, the fifties and earlier decades. Movements and programmes 
with a high-key political tone and flavour, or confrontationist action 
simply have not survived the forces of order and constraint. They then 
have to move underground or the activists have to flee the country, 
leaving the more cautious members to subsist on political nostalgia. This 
author does not discount the presence of underground movements - the pro­
cession of political trials is ready evidence of the virility of the 
A.N.C and other underground movements. But their power to disrupt e 
political and economic system with notably efficient security seems to be 
circumscribed and their effect on rank and file action, despite wide­
spread sentiments in favour of the underground movements, appears also to 
be limited. The potential action of refugees, organised by the A.N.C., 
operating in guerilla action on the borders of the country, in an inter­
national climate which offers sympathy and active support for such move­
ments, would be more serious a threat to the system. However, the 
question of which borders arises - no such action against South Africa as 
such has yet started and South Africa exercises a powerful influence 
through a variety of linkages on even those borders which are most hostile 
and which would otherwise consider playing host to guerilla movements.
Then again, the type of internal action which has made an 
impact, albeit far short of threatening the system (the 1973 strikes, the 
township youth disturbances) while in one case certainly not devoid of 
prior planning and organization, appeared to erupt in consequence of 
what one may call socio-political factors - critical levels of grievance 
or anxiety among the groups affected. It is clear that both the government 
and industry have recently taken cognisance of these causes and a period 
of strategic although limited reform seems to have been entered.
In a situation of inequality and political alienation such 
as that of South Africa, the unexpected can always occur - the spectre
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of the mass political uprising is ever present. Yet, the stage has 
been set for the entrance of this spectre (or hero) for decades if not 
half a century or more without its appearance. If the political 
scientist or political sociologist wishes to avoid repeating the mistake 
of premature predictions of internal upheaval, urban terror, etc., the 
temptation of projecting the objective dimensions of racial inequality 
onto the anticipated dimensions of black reaction has to be rigorously 
avoided. In a context of what this author believes to be cautious 
wisdom, the strategy and consequences of a movement like Inkatha have 
to be carefully assessed.
If Inkatha lives up to its design (always a problematic question 
in a situation of constraint) it could, for the first time in black 
politics, reap the benefit of a strategy of a type proposed by Dr. Xuma 
of the .AN.C in the forties, a strategy never fully implemented. The 
strategy is one of enrolment and mobilisation aimed at a longer-term 
goal without political activism or calculated political risk-taking.
Before discussing the goal, two procedural questions arise. The first; 
is it possible to mobilise and enrol members on a large scale without 
political drama or flamboyance? It may be possible if a measure of 
enforced enrolment occurs. This policy will always be criticised by 
idealists but has its merits. Inkatha, it would seem, has already adopted 
such a strategy by using the sanctioning power of the KwaZulu Administra­
tion to nudge teachers, civil servants and others into cooperating. The 
second question is will Inkatha survive? Will not the kind of analysis 
being presented here, and the strategies outlined or hinted at by 
Inkatha's leader, alert the South African security system to certain 
longer-term dangers for the system and result in its being banned? This 
may be so, but if so, the security strategy would reveal a surprising 
lack of sophistication. Inkatha offers and can continue to offer the 
South African government a substantial return for allowing Inkatha's 
continued existence. Inkatha has already prevented the township dis­
turbances from spreading to Natal and counter-balances the influence of 
confrontation-minded black leaders. Chief Buthelezi has opposed calls 
for disinvestment in South Africa and KwaZulu confuses the critics of 
Separate Development. This is a necessary trade-off and should not be 
hastily or superficially condemned by opponents of the South African 
government.
This situation of 'trade-off' is likely to continue to earn 
Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi the bitter umbrage of the radically oriented
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black intelligentsia. This group, which quite understandably is self­
consciously modern and anti-traditional (its Africanism would be more 
appropriately termed 'Neo-Africanism'); which is the heir to a long 
political tradition informed by the unitary state democratic ideal (the 
reverse side of the coin of British colonial and neo-colonial domination) 
which has been influenced by the particularly paradigmatic quality of 
liberal and radical political scholarship concerned with South Africa, 
which can most easily acquire legitimacy as a leader-group through a 
spokesman role embodying an unambiguously anti-government stance, and 
which experiences critical status anxieties as a well-educated mobile 
group denied social esteem by the racial conventions of the society, 
will inevitably feel very ill at ease about a leader like Chief Buthelezi. 
Chief Buthelezi contrasts with this group in many ways. He is a Zulu 
aristocrat, valuing his high traditional legitimacy, and as such ex­
periences little of the status anxieties of the new intelligentsia; he
is using government-created institutions and he does not have to be a
69)spokesman leader whose image rests only on the quality and consistency
of his criticism of Apartheid; he is both a spokesman and a strategist,
blending principle,'.calculated planning and pragmatism. The conflict
between Inkatha and sections of the black intelligentsia is unlikely
70)to abate and Buthelezi will probably continue his present strategy 
of attempting to win cooperation from this group;but where this fails, will 
simply stake his support against theirs. In this regard one should 
note that support for Buthelezi does not appear to fall below roughly 
20% in any non-Zulu ethnic group and his overall support among the 
whole emergent African ’middle class’ in Soweto, Durban and Pretoria is
71)only some 10% below his support among all Africans in these areas; 
hence his political base in the population at large is extensive.
Finally, however, one must assess the relative viability of 
Inkatha in the light of the possible outcomes of its strategy. One 
possible outcome, and the one most commonly feared by those who see 
Inkatha as radical and dangerous is a mass strike, concentrated perhaps 
in Natal. This would have far-reaching political implications but even 
a mass strike could not be sustained for more than a week or two -
69) ' This observation owes its origin to Professor Heribert Adam, tiae
prominent South Africanist scholar.
70) A recent manifestation of this conflict has even occurred inside 
Inkatha with an apparent rift between the former Secretary 
General, Dr. S. Bengu and the Inkatha leadership, Daily NewSj 
October 17th, 1978.
71) Hanf et al. op ait.3 pp.373-374.
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workers have to feed their families, and the reaction of the government, 
aside from increased strategic reform, would probably be to destroy 
the organisation by force if necessary. Inkatha may develop a con- 
frontationist strategy along those lines, but it would not be the 
optimal course.
Another strategy, and perhaps the one which is most congruent 
with the current tone and stance of the organisation, is that which has 
been called a 'groundswell' by Buthelezi and which one may alternatively 
term the 'demonstration effect' strategy. Mass mobilisation, in itself, 
if sufficiently comprehensive, can be a powerful encouragement to a 
government to make fundamental policy adaptations and even to negotiate 
with the representatives of the mobilised mass. No government is likely 
to court predictable unrest by ignoring massive mobilisation. In South 
Africa this is perhaps the only peaceful strategy likely to achieve 
significant consequences. What might these consequences be, at a minimum?
The South African Minister concerned with African Affairs has
indicated that the government is prepared to accommodate a homeland which
72)does not wish to take independence, and there have been various govern­
ment suggestions of a 'confederal' link between such homelands and the 
South African core area. The degree and type of power-sharing which 
could be involved in a system of over-arching political linkage must be 
seen as a variable factor, dependent upon the relative bargaining strength 
of the contending units. Buthelezi is currently firm in his rejection 
of independence, but, on the other hand, he is building the 'identity' 
of a power-centre in KwaZulu alternative or additional to that of Pretoria. 
Currently, for example, a prestige parliament building is due to be built 
at Ulundi, and KwaZulu has its own flag. Many critics of Buthelezi see 
these moves as an indication that he would accept independence if offered 
a reasonable consolidation of the KwaZulu territory. This is perhaps 
a possibility, but in view of all Buthelezi's policy statements and the 
goals and scope of Inkatha it is hardly a probability.
On the basis of these observations, it would seem likely that
Buthelezi might aim to take Inkatha into any future negotiating situation
(perhaps extended in time) with a fall-back position of accepting a
73)federal state, with an enlarged KwaZulu being the political 'centre'
72) Interview with Dr. Connie Mulder, Rand Daily Mail3 March 15th, 1978.
73) See earlier discussion of Buthelezi's political goals.
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of a federal 'segment’. This 'segment', however, would extend well beyond 
the geographic confines of KwaZulu, and almost certainly, because of 
alliances, beyond the ethnic confines of the Zulu language group. This 
might seem like a mere extension of separate development to some, but 
given the bargaining power of a mobilised working class, could un­
doubtedly involve fairly massive influence on central policy.
The South African government on the other hand, probably would 
press for a confederal arrangement with as little power-sharing as 
possible, but it too, would have a fail-back position; a position con­
taining certain advantages. The attractions of having a powerful, 
legitimate black partner in central government to help stave off external 
and internal pressures could counter-balance a reluctance to share power, 
provided white political identity could be maintained. Furthermore, a 
loose confederacy might be a security threat. A Federation could also 
form the basis of progressive further developments.
To the extent that popular mobilisation could ensure real 
black influence on central policies, ultimately formalised in a con­
stitution and even perhaps symbolised by a joint presidency, the kind 
of scenario outlined - essentially a consociational devolution of power - 
must be seen as qualitatively very different from separate development. 
Above all, it is a peaceful strategy and this consideration simply 
cannot be made light of in a situation where an armed struggle would be 
very much more destructive and long-drawn out than any violence hitherto 
seen in Southern Africa, with the destruction of an economy of utmost 
importance to the whole region as but one of its costs. Inkatha may well 
hold out for a more ambitious settlement, but as a possible minimum and 
realistic outcome, the implications of the present Inkatha strategy which 
have been outlined hold considerable promise for the interests of every­
day Africans in South Africa.
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